Interview with John Wesley Jones

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JOHN WESLEY JONES

Interviewed by: Horace G. Torbert

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Q: This is an interview under the auspices of the Association for Diplomatic Studies with Ambassador John Wesley Jones. This took place at DACOR Bacon House on Wednesday, May 11, 1988. The interviewer was Horace G. Torbert.

Ambassador Jones, I would appreciate it if you would start out by telling us maybe a little about how you first got interested in foreign affairs and how you came to be in the Foreign Service. And then go on, as you feel comfortable, with a more or less chronological account of the posts you served in, and what you did in them and what the relations of the United States were with those countries during your time there.

JONES: When I was a junior, I think, in Sioux City Central High School, the registrar of the high school had been a clerk in the American embassy in Paris during the First World War. She took a fancy to me and talked to me about the Foreign Service and suggested that I might think about it as a career. Then also a maiden aunt, a sister of my father, thought this would be a great career so she encouraged me in it, too. So for the last two years of high school and my four years in college, I determined that that's the career I wanted to follow.

For my last two years in college, I persuaded my father to send me to Washington, DC since in Sioux City, Iowa not many people knew much about the Foreign Service and I thought that perhaps in Washington I would learn more about it. Because of my father's religious prejudices, I knew that it was useless to ask him to send me to the Foreign Service school at Georgetown run by Jesuits, but I learned that George Washington University had received that year a grant of a million dollars to establish a foreign service school. The Masonic Lodge was apparently worried about the influence of the Jesuits on the future of Foreign Service Officers and decided they would like to have a foreign school in a non-religious university.

So I enrolled at G.W. as a junior in 1928 and graduated in 1930 in liberal arts, took the Foreign Service examinations the summer of 1930 here in Washington. On the 31st of December I received a letter in Sioux City, Iowa telling me that I had not only passed the Foreign Service exams but that also my appointment as a career Foreign Service Officer had been approved by the Senate.

Q: That's great. Had you had the oral exam, too?

JONES: Yes, I had taken the oral. I stayed in Washington for the oral exam rather than going back out home.

So it was a matter of great rejoicing. The new year came in, January, 1931, and I had orders to proceed to a post in northern Mexico for my neophyte training. In those days, Foreign Service Officers went first to a post abroad and then returned for their schooling in the Foreign Service School. So I left Sioux City on the 10th of January, 1931, and with four layovers en route and five days travel, I finally arrived in Saltillo, Mexico, which is the capital of the state of Coahuila. The principal officer there was Samuel Sokobin, who had served. ...

Q: How do you spell Sokobin?

JONES: S-o-k-o-b-i-n. He was a Chinese language officer and had served the first 14 years of his service in China. The Department, deciding that he needed a change, had made him principal Officer of this small consulate in northern Mexico.

Saltillo is 150 miles straight up the mountain from Monterrey, which is much better known. Monterrey, which is something like 1500 feet above sea level, Saltillo was a mile high, over 5000 feet. Beautiful small, colonial town. Charming place to be stationed for the first time abroad.

Mr. Sokobin was a very thoughtful and helpful principal officer who insisted that I read all incoming and outgoing dispatches, some of them confidential, which was the highest classification, I assume, that the consulate ever received. And also that every morning for half an hour, he and I would read the Consular Regulations which was a rather formidable tome in those days. It was a splendid introduction. My salary was \$2500 a year. My rental allowance was \$50 a month and I had a post allowance to adjust my official salary to living expenses, of \$200 a year. So I wrote to my family that when all of my food and lodging had been paid at the local hotel, I had spent only \$40 a month out of my salary to maintain myself. That included my laundry and mending. I felt so affluent in those dark days in the midst of the Depression that I opened a bank account in the local Mexican bank and even had enough money left over to help my brother through school at Iowa State University at Ames. In late August, a telegram came signed "Castle, Acting Secretary" transferring me to the Foreign Service School in Washington on the 15th of September.

I left with great sadness, many friends. The young Mexicans there who were my age had all, most of them, gone to school in the States so that I learned very little Spanish, since they all spoke excellent English and were delighted to have a chance to continue using their English in talking to me.

After three months in the State Department in the fall of 1931, I was assigned to Calcutta, India. I went home for Christmas.

Q: Before we get that, let's just ask you, what was your actual function in Saltillo? Were you issuing visas or. ...

JONES: Oh. As Vice Consul, I issued visas to Mexicans wanting to go to the United States. But also we had consular invoices which were issued to exporters of lead from the local lead mine to the United States. And I think probably that the major portion of the consular fees were collected from these invoices — there was a local mine run by an English company and they exported lead to the United States. They had to get a consular invoice before they could ship it.

Q: I just wanted to get that much so we could get. ...

JONES: So it was mostly consular invoices and visas and a small American colony with passports, requiring services.

Q: Now we were about to go to Calcutta, you said you were assigned to Calcutta.

JONES: Yes. I arrived in September at the Foreign Service School and, after 3 months went to Sioux City for Christmas, knowing that I had already been assigned to Calcutta. In early January 1932, I proceeded to New York, where I got one of the American Export Line ships to Alexandria, Egypt. In Alexandria the Consul there had received instructions to purchase a ticket for me to proceed on to Calcutta. He confessed to me later that he had misunderstood "the first available vessel" and had bought mea ticket on a German freighter rather than waiting for the Peninsular and Oriental steamship line which most passengers took from Alexandria to Bombay. So I had a very interesting trip as the only passenger on a German freighter through the Suez Canal. We stopped at Aden; our next stop was in Ceylon, at Columbo. Tommy Thompson — Llewellyn Thompson, was the U.S. Vice Consul in Columbo then. And since the ship was in port there for three days he kindly showed me around Columbo and I had a very pleasant and agreeable stay.

And then the ship went on, the freighter went on, to Madras and there I met the Consular Officer in Madras and had two days there and finally arrived in Calcutta on the 22nd of February 1932. I think that I expended probably the maximum allowed by the Department in those days sailing to a new post, which was 45 days.

In Calcutta the Principal Officer was Arthur G. Frost and Gerald Keith was the Principal Vice Consul. Dorsey Fisher was there as a Vice Consul. And I think I was the Junior Vice Consul, well I obviously was, when I arrived on the 22nd of February 1932. In Calcutta my job was double, number one, to issue visas to Indians wishing to visit or migrate to the United States. And, number two, the growing American colony in Calcutta required passport services. I stayed first at the Grand Hotel on Chowringhee and then eventually moved into a house with Fritz Jandrey and Russ Engdahl when they appeared as Vice Consuls in Calcutta.

Q: Fritz Jandrey and who else did you say?

JONES: Russ Engdahl, E-n-g-d-a-h-l.

We adopted the British custom of calling the house a chummery because there were many bachelors, principally English, in Calcutta in those days and they couldn't afford apartments by themselves, so they took houses. Our house was quite an elegant place, but it was still called a chummery. There were four of us by that time, including Wilson Flake, then an Assistant Trade Commissioner.

I spent three years in Calcutta and at the end of my three-year tour I either had to pay my own way home or wait until the Department decided to transfer me to another post. So on my salary I had saved up enough money to buy a ticket on a freighter from Calcutta to Manila. I bought a ticket on a Dutch freighter this time which took me around Southeast Asia en route to the Philippines. We stopped in Singapore where I first met Harrison Lewis, colleague of mine, same class; and then on to Hong Kong where Donald Dunham was the

Vice Consul; and finally to the Philippines, where Bart Richards, former Assistant Trade Commissioners in Calcutta, was then stationed. After four or five days in the Philippines, I took an American passenger boat to San Francisco and then finally arrived in Sioux City, Iowa by train four days later.

It was while I was in Sioux City that I learned that the Department needed a Vice Consul in Rome, Italy. And since I was still on my own, I had to pay my way to Washington to pick up my official orders. Only from Washington was my travel paid to New York to board an American Export Line ship to Naples.

I arrived in Rome 1935, June. And I remember taking a taxi from the railroad station up the Via Veneto to the Consulate in the building next to the Palazzo Margherita. I couldn't believe the beauty of the city. After three years in Calcutta, to arrive in a place like Rome was like going from Hades to Paradise. In Rome the Principal Officer was Graham Kemper and his assistant was Gilson Blake. I was the Vice Consul in charge of immigration for Italians going to the United States, passports for Americans, and registration of the large American colony living in Rome.

Q: You mentioned the Palazzo Margherita. Was that at that time the American Embassy?

JONES: No.

Q: But the Consulate was where it is today?

JONES: The Consulate was where it is today. And the great building back of it, which is now. ...

Q: USIA, or it was the last time I was there.

JONES: On the other side of the garden. That was the chancery of the American Embassy. The Ambassador was William Phillips. Harold Tittmann was the Counselor of the Embassy and Sam Reber was one of the Second or Third Secretaries at the Embassy.

I was a Vice Consul, I did Vice Consular work, registration of Americans living in Rome, etc.

Q: At that time was there still a, legally of course the Consular Service and the Diplomatic Service were united, but was there still somewhat of a separation in attitude between the people who did consular work and people who did, quote, pure diplomatic work?

JONES: Oh, very much. Yes. The Consular Service, most of the people in the Consular Service, including my boss, had come up through the Consular cone. I fully expected that that's what I would continue in my career. But I became a very good friend of Sam Reber, who was in the Embassy across the garden. There were some very attractive young women in the American colony in Rome, some of them half Italian, half American, so we had a very pleasant and agreeable social life. It was in Rome that I met my wife, who was the daughter of the Assistant Naval Attach# at that time.

Q: That was during this period?

JONES: That was during this period, yes.

Trying to remember, now — I was entitled to home leave during this period but I think while payment of home leave travel had gone into effect, those stationed in Europe were the last to benefit from this limited allotment so that those of us stationed in Europe still had to pay our own home leave back and forth. I went home in 1938 and there Kitty and I were married in Annapolis at St. Ann's. We came back to Rome in the summer of 1938 and continued living in my charming apartment on the Via Nomentana, corner of Via Massawa, across from the great house, the Villa Blanca where Alexander Kirk had lived as the Minister Counselor of our Embassy.

During this whole period, of course, Mussolini was the virtual dictator, Prime Minister, of Italy; King Victor Emmanuel II was the monarch. I was still in Rome in 1938, '39, when Neville Chamberlain made his famous trip — '38, was it? — famous trip to Munich and

came out with the famous statement, "Peace in our time." And I must confess that we were all relieved, those of us stationed abroad. We had seen war pressing down, or the threats of war, with Hitler's continued move first into Austria and then into other parts of Europe. So we were all very reassured by this; that we would indeed have peace in our time.

Q: As Immigration Officer, did you run into the Jewish immigration problem at that time? Did that center in Rome at all? Were there a lot of refugee Jews who. ...

JONES: Yes. Yes, there were.

Q: And did this become a major problem in Rome, as it was in some other places?

JONES: Yes, there was a great deal of work and a great deal of research that had to be done. Enrico Fermi was one of the Italians of the Jewish faith who came and applied for a visa to go to the United States. I gave it to him and of course Enrico Fermi meant nothing to me in those days. But it's only been since, that I have seen what prominence he played as a scientist in this country and the important role he has played in the development atomic energy, that I really realized that I did indeed perform a useful service in giving a visa to Enrico Fermi. And I'm sure there were many others who came to this country and who have made a great contribution.

Q: So you left, however, before the war actually started?

JONES: No. We were in Rome in 1940 when Mussolini declared war on France. The gesture that Winston Churchill described as a stab in the back of their poor ally, France. In 1940 our first child was born in Rome. In 1941 I had been in Italy almost six years.

Sam Reber had left the Embassy and gone back to the State Department and had become the Italian Desk Officer. Because of the war and because of the refugees and because of Mussolini's increasing association with Hitler, the Vatican and Italian Desk needed an assistant. So with eternal thanks to Sam Reber, he asked for me to be transferred

from Rome and from the Consular Service to the State Department as his assistant on the Italian Desk. In order to get out of Italy in those days, we had to go — the British had blockaded the Mediterranean, so it was impossible for us to sail from an Italian port to Gibraltar to get a ship to the United States. So we took a train north through northern Italy and across southern France, which was then Vichy France. Isn't that correct?

Q: Yes, certainly. By that time.

JONES: Finally when we got into Spain, which was neutral, for the first time we had real bread and real coffee, after living on ersatz, (very scarce and strange looking bread) in Italy ever since 1940 when the war had started.

Then eventually we traveled by train across Spain and across Portugal where the bread and the coffee were even better. When we got to Lisbon we boarded an American ship on which we sailed to the United States. Of course this long train trip through Italy and across southern France and across Spain and across into Portugal, which I think took all together 10 days or two weeks, we had a child who was less than a year old. So my wife had very thoughtfully had a crib of straw made which we put in the train compartment on the seat on the other side of us and the baby lived and slept and ate. ...

Q: For ten days.

JONES: ... there, for ten days. And I can remember when we got to Portugal and some of our colleagues said, oh, that poor baby, how did he survive the trip? I'm afraid my reaction was not very paternal. I said, poor baby, hell, how did we survive? Because we had to fix the baby food and heat the milk on little Sterno stoves and all kinds of things. And the baby never had it so good.

Anyway, that was the end of my first Roman tour. During that period, of course, while I was in the Consulate and had nothing to do with the diplomatic side of our relations, William Phillips continued to be the Ambassador. But I did leave before Pearl Harbor so that I

got out on my own free will and was not interned, as were William Phillips and the other members of the Embassy following December 7, 1941.

Q: Then did you go immediately to work on the Italian desk?

JONES: I think I was given a month's leave. So I took my wife and child out to Sioux City, lowa to introduce them to my family and then came back and we found a house in the blueprint stage in Alexandria, Virginia, three-story rowhouse in Yates Gardens. Since I had no money, still living on a rather meager Vice Consul's salary — or perhaps by this time I had been promoted to the rank of Consul, and I was no longer unclassified, I think I was FSO-8 — my wife had a dowry of \$1,000 from her grandmother in Puerto Rico so I used that as a down payment on the house. The cost of the house was \$7,500. Within a few months we moved into this house and lived there. I commuted from Alexandria to the State Department for the next four years.

In the State Department I helped Sam on the Italian Desk and then we established a Vatican Desk, because Harold Tittmann was stationed there as the assistant to the first U.S. representative to the Vatican, Myron Taylor. Myron Taylor would go there occasionally as President Roosevelt's Representative, but the Resident Representative there was Harold Tittmann, career Foreign Service Officer, who had formerly been in the American Embassy in Rome. We needed a Desk Officer for the Vatican so I assisted Sam as the Assistant Desk Officer for the Vatican and Italy. Then eventually Sam moved over to be Desk Officer for France and Belgium, etc. So I then became the Desk Officer for Italy and the Vatican, in which positions I served until the end of the war, 1945.

But during that period there was a reorganization in the Department and something called Southern European Affairs was established with a Director and it was separated from Western European Affairs. Cavendish Cannon was the Director of that new Division.. Because Italy was in South Europe, Italy came under that Southern European designation,-Division-which included the Balkans. So Cavendish Cannon was my boss

up until my reassignment to Italy in 1945, after I had completed four years in the State Department.

Q: That was after the end of the war that you went back to Italy?

JONES: Yes. We went over on a troop ship to Italy because there was no regular passenger ship service. There was great doubt whether or not my wife should accompany me since she was pregnant, but I finally persuaded the Department medical staff to let her. She did not want to stay in Alexandria (Virginia) with two children, awaiting a third without me, so we all sailed off together and arrived in Naples in early July 1945. Of course the war in the Far East was still going on and the war in Europe had been over a very short time, only since May. We arrived back in Rome to find it really quite a shattered and unfamiliar city.

Q: What was your assignment? What were you doing?

JONES: I was assigned to Rome as First Secretary of the Embassy in charge of the Political Section. By that time the Embassy was in the Palazzo Margherita.

Q: Yes, I think we got that right after the war.

JONES: Right after the war. I'm not quite sure when that happened, but when I went back the Political Section was on the second floor of the Palazzo Margherita, facing the building off to the left, looking out over the old Consular building. The Ambassador was Alexander Kirk. Does that seem right?

Q: That seems quite, yes.

JONES: And David Key was the Charg# d'Affaires. And I was head of the Political Section as First Secretary.

I must confess that I believe that Umberto was the — I'd have to go back and check my notes.

Q: He was still King briefly until the Republic.

JONES: Yes, he was no longer the Prince Regent, I believe. I'm not quite sure about the date. But I think that he was then the King. What, was he King Umberto II?

Q: Yes. I don't recall the dates, but they voted,-held a plebiscite-on the monarchy.

JONES: Oh, yes. That was during the time that I was there. And we were very much in favor of having a plebiscite on the future form of government. But when I got there, I was there during the elections for Prime Minister. And King Umberto was still the King. Togliatti was head of the Italian Communist Party. There was great concern indeed, because of the strong influence of the Soviet Union in Europe in those days, that the Communist Party might win. To the great joy and satisfaction of all of us, Alcide de Gasperi won the elections with the Christian Democrats and became the first Prime Minister under the King.

Then it was during that period of de Gasperi's premiership that a plebiscite was held on whether or not the Italians wanted to have a republic or continue with the monarchy. There was a resounding victory in favor of a republic and opposed to the monarchy. So King Umberto and the Queen left with good grace and proceeded, I think, to Switzerland. But that's a matter of history.

The first presidential elections were held and Luigi Einaudi was elected the first President of the new Republic of Italy and moved into the Palazzo Quirinale.

By the way, this is an aside. One of his sons is a professor.

Q: At Cornell, I think, or was at Cornell. He may be somewhere else.

JONES: He's somewhere else now because I've seen him a couple of times.

Q: I think maybe he's at George Washington [University] now.

JONES: It may be that I've seen him at George Washington a couple of times and have told him about my experience in Italy during the time that his father was elected.

Well, those were obviously very exciting days. They're all well recorded in history so I don't know that there's anything that I can particularly add to that. Jimmy Dunn succeeded Alexander Kirk as Ambassador in Rome and was there during all of the rest of the period that I was stationed in the Embassy in Rome.

In 1948 after three years in Rome I was transferred to Nanking, China. This of course came as a great surprise to me and to most of the old China hands. But I learned when I got back to the Department that some of my old friends in EUR felt that Johnny Jones had been in Italy long enough, practically since 1935-from 1935 to 1941-then four years on the Italian Desk in the Department, and then back in Italy again for another three years, so all together it was about 13 years of unbroken Italian service. So they decided that I should have a change. Also, there was an effort in China to resist a Communist takeover with the increasing Communist influence there. It was felt that someone who had lived through the defeat of Togliatti in the elections in Italy in the 1940s might be a useful member of the staff to point out all the dangers and difficulties of permitting China to become another Communist power.

Q: And also you'd had some China training from your first boss, perhaps.

JONES: Not really. No.

Q: That's interesting. Could Kitty go with you there-to China?

JONES: Oh, yes. Because the Communists were still off in the west. All of the east coast of China was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek and his government.

We were given home leave en route to China in 1948 and for at least one month my wife and three children and I visited my family in Sioux City. My mother was still living there and my brother and his wife were there and were our hosts. Then we proceeded by train to San Francisco and then from San Francisco took a ship — Dollar Line, I think it was, from San Francisco to Shanghai. In Shanghai we were met by Jack Cabot, who was the Consul General in those days, put on a train and proceeded to Nanking which was the capital of the Nationalist government in 1948.

Dr. Leighton Stuart was the Ambassador there in those days and Lewis Clark was the Minister Counselor of the Embassy. We were promptly moved into very attractive quarters of the Embassy compound just across the road from the Ambassador's residence and the residence of the Minister Counselor, Lewis Clark. Our next door neighbor in the Embassy compound was Livingston Merchant and his wife, Betty. Livy was the Counselor of the Economic Section and I was head of the Political Section.

However, in December of 1948 the Communists under Mao Zedong captured Peking where we had a Consulate General. And when this happened the Ambassador felt so concerned about the wives and children and about the imminent danger of Nanking as the next target of the Communist army that he ordered all wives and children to be evacuated to the Philippines. So within a very short time Kitty and the three children flew in a C-47 with the other wives and children to the Philippines where they were stationed in a kind of temporary camp on the grounds of the Philippine University. I visited them there Christmas of '48 and realized that they were not very comfortable living in rather cramped refugee quarters. My wife always referred to the place disparagingly as Camp P.U.

In any event, in January I was still in Nanking in the Embassy. My wife's family (my father-in-law was with IT&T after his retirement from the Marine Corps) had been transferred to

Rome, so my wife and children sailed back to Rome to join her parents in Italy and I was left in the Orient by myself.

Q: You had to keep Jones in Rome as much as possible.

JONES: That's right. That was a long, difficult summer for me. Finally in August of 1949 Ambassador Leighton Stuart was evacuated, went out on a military plane back to the U.S.-Lewis Clark had moved with the government to Canton, which was where Chiang Kai-shek had established his government when the Communist armies kept moving nearer and nearer to Nanking. So while I was not the Charg# d'Affaires, Lewis Clark was the Charg# d'Affaires in Canton, I was in charge of what was left of the Embassy in Nanking after August 1, 1949.

I'm sorry I don't have my dates straight but I think it must have been in April of '49, I was there when the Communists took Nanking. To my astonishment, the Nationalist government had all left so that for 24 or 48 hours, (first time in my life) we were a city without any authority, no one to appeal to. By that time I had moved into Lewis Clark's former house in the Embassy compound, where the Ambassador's residence was as well. That was fairly well walled-around, a well fortressed, well protected compound, and we still had some of the Marine guard with us. The thing that was the greatest danger was not the incoming Communist troops who had already crossed the Yangtze, but looters. I remember standing on the high ground just inside the Embassy compound wall looking out over the city of Nanking and being horrified at all of the fires that had been set, most of them in empty houses belonging to officials of the Chiang Kai-shek government who had fled to Canton leaving their houses with some provisions and some furniture but empty and unoccupied. And after the local populace had ravaged these houses and looted them, they then set fire to them. We were advised by someone who had lived through incidents like this formerly in the Far East that the best way to keep looters away was to assure them that the place was occupied and that there were firearms inside. So, every 15 minutes or every half hour or whenever it seemed appropriate, the Marine guards would

shoot their guns off into the air to let prospective looters know that this was not a place that was easy to attack. Because it was occupied and because it was armed, we were really never in any danger of looters coming near because they had so many other unoccupied places that they could go to. I never would have thought that I would welcome the advent of Communist troops into a city where I was living, but I can assure you that it was with some joy that I saw the Communist troops come into Nanking the next day. Order was very quickly restored.

It was possible for me, after a few days, to go out and go to the Chancery, which was outside the Embassy compound, and to continue to conduct business there. I used to walk back and forth to the Chancery during the days that the Communists were in occupation there, never with any concern or fear from local populace or from them.

Q: Did you establish some sort of a relationship with the commanding officer of the Communist groups? Or was it just a stand-off, so to speak.

JONES: It was a stand-off. No, I did not. Because we were still accredited to the government of Chiang Kai-shek so therefore I did not have instructions other than on local or personal basis to be in touch with the local military group, who were there in charge.

This was in April, I think I said.

Q: April of '49.

JONES: April of '49, yes, that was when the Communists took Nanking. And in September I received orders to report to the Department of State. I'm sorry, Tully, forgive me. I'm going to have to think about this a little bit.

Q: One of the things that seems very interesting to me about this period is what did you do to keep yourself from going crazy during this time when you had no relations with anybody and in a sense not much work to do other than housekeeping?

JONES: We had a much smaller staff, of course, by this time because most of the staff had been taken by Lewis Clark to Canton. But we did have enough of a staff to keep this little section and what was left of the Embassy in Nanking going and what we did was report. And we were permitted, interestingly enough, to send out coded messages and to continue to use our communications system.

Q: Was this your own radio facility in those days or did they go out over commercial wires?

JONES: Tully, I think they went out over commercial wires. I must confess that I don't remember. This is probably written someplace in my letters home which I will read someday. [N.B. the U.S. and British Embassies in Nanking had their own radio facilities so they did not use commercial wires] But we were permitted to continue to communicate with Shanghai and with Canton and with the Department on what was developing in this area and what our British and French and Italian colleagues were doing. As the Communists moved south and took over Shanghai and then moved on toward Hong Kong, the Department decided that it should close its mission in Nanking and this decision was taken along with most of our allies, including the British government and the Italian government. So an evacuation ship was sent into Shanghai and most of us, the American Embassy and the British Embassy — Leo Lamb was the British Charg# d'Affaires, and the Italian Ambassador, Sergio Fenoaltea, and his staff, we all went out on the same train to Shanghai to board the evacuation ship which was sent there for all of the Western diplomats.

I can remember when I went to the Chinese Communist authorities in Nanking to get passage from the country and my train ticket to Shanghai, I showed them my diplomatic passport and I said that I was the American Charg# d'Affaires in Nanking. And they said, we don't recognize you as the Charg# d'Affaires. We do not recognize your government or any of its officials. But we will give you a permit, a pass, as an American citizen living

in China, to get to Shanghai. So I left Nanking as Mr. Jones, as a non-official of the U.S. government.

When we got to Shanghai we still had a Consulate General there; they had not all been evacuated, some of their staff went out with us. I'm afraid I don't remember the name of the ship now but in any event we went on an evacuation ship to Hong Kong, which was still untouched and still a British colony. The first class on the ship was for the Chiefs of Mission. Since I was the Charg# d'Affaires in Nanking and Leo Lamb was the Charge of the British Embassy, we and the Italian Ambassador were all put in one cabin which I think had four bunks. So first class was four bunks and the poor Third Secretaries and Vice Consuls were down in the hold of the ship. I went down once and decided I never wanted to go down again. When I got back up, I couldn't really complain about four to a cabin.

In any event, it was not a very long trip and when we got to Hong Kong we were welcomed there by. ...

Q: Whoever the Consul General was at the time.

JONES: Yes. And I know his name perfectly well, but. ...

Q: We can look that up.

JONES: I stayed in Hong Kong long enough to arrange my travel to Italy because I wanted to join my family there. I believe that my home leave orders covered enough of my travel ticket that I was able to pay for the rest of it to join my family. I arrived in Rome at the airport on October 3, 1949.

Q: By this time you could travel by commercial air.

JONES: Yes. By commercial air from Hong Kong to Rome. That's right. It was one of the first trips I had ever made by air, probably; I hadn't thought of that. While there I learned at the Embassy that, by the grace of God, they needed a First Secretary in Madrid. So I was

transferred again from Hell to Heaven-from Nanking to Madrid. I was ordered back to the Department for briefing. My family then would travel directly from Italy to Madrid to meet me there when I arrived.

After briefings at the Spanish Desk in the Department, I arrived in Rome in November of 1949.

Q: Arrived in Madrid.

JONES: I'm sorry, forgive me. Arrived in Madrid in November of 1949. By the grace of God, within a few minutes I learned, after I got there, that my wife and children were arriving, shortly, by plane from Rome. So I just waited at the airport for their arrival and we had a wonderful family reunion at the airport in Madrid, and from there proceeded to the. ...

Q: Palace, the Ritz?

JONES: No. Tully, it was that nice little hotel not very far from the Embassy. Oh. In any event, the hotel had the same name as the street and it was within walking distance of the Embassy. [Hotel Velazquez on Calle Velasquez]

Q: I can't remember what the name of it is. It's terrible.

JONES: Yes. But in any event, that's where we stayed at the beginning. Just let me think a little bit about Madrid.

In those days we had no Ambassador because we had broken relations, no, we had withdrawn our Ambassador from Spain over protests with Franco's alliance with the Axis powers. So Paul Culbertson was the Charg# d'Affaires and I was the First Secretary in the Embassy in charge of the Political Section. Paul and Maria Culbertson were living in that beautiful residence on Ramon de la Cruz, which is now the residence of the Minister Counselor of the Embassy.

It was an interesting time and I began taking Spanish lessons immediately. It was a difficult transition from Italian to Spanish. Of course in those days we had to take our lessons outside of office hours so that I had to have my lesson from 8 to 9 before the Embassy opened. Considering Madrid social hours, it was difficult to be available and to be. ...

Q: Be compos mentis by 8:00 in the morning.

JONES: Be compos mentis by 8:00 in the morning.

Q: When you didn't sit down to dinner until 11:00 at least.

JONES: That's right. I think it's very possible that we did change my tutor's hours, but I had a wonderful man from a northern university who was very precise.

Q: Vallelados. I had him, too.

JONES: Vallelados, was that he?

Q: Yes.

JONES: He was wonderful and taught me wonderful Castilian Spanish.

It was very interesting, delightful time. Paul and Maria were still there, I think, when it was decided to re-establish full diplomatic relations with the Spanish government. By that time we had moved out of the hotel and into what was then quite a far out residential area.

Q: Colonia del Viso?

JONES: Colonia del Viso, thank you very much. We rented a house there, fully furnished, from Spaniards and lived there until the first Ambassador arrived. The first Ambassador was — I've just thought of his name.

After the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, the first Ambassador to be appointed by the U.S. government to Madrid was Stanton Griffis, a retired Director of MGM and a most interesting man. He had served as Ambassador in Poland and also in Buenos Aires. So this was not his first ambassadorial post. But he left a great deal of the running of the Embassy to me since I was by that time, with Paul Culbertson's departure, I was the Counselor and number two in the Embassy. Because Stanton Griffis was unmarried he was very thoughtful and kind to my wife and always, in official functions, treated her as his hostess.

He was accompanied by Angie and Margaret Duke. Angie Duke is Angier Biddle Duke, who later had a very interesting career in the Foreign Service himself. But the Dukes were brought along by Stanton Griffis to be his immediate assistants, one on the social side and Angie on the diplomatic side. They both lived with the Ambassador in the Embassy residence.

The Ambassador did not like the house on Ramon de la Cruz. He thought it was too small for him, so he persuaded the Department to give him a rental allowance. He rented another palacio, the name of which I have forgotten, not very far from the Chancery and that's where he lived in great style with the Dukes. The Ramon de la Cruz house was standing empty. And since the U.S. owned it, I asked the Ambassador if he minded if I lived in it, move my family into it? He said no problem at all. Since it was furnished, Kitty and I with our children left the house in del Viso and moved into that beautiful residence on Ramon de la Cruz and spent the rest of our Spanish tour there.

Stanton Griffis was in Spain less than a year. I think he became rather bored with it. He was succeeded by Lincoln MacVeagh who had been our Ambassador in Portugal. When President Eisenhower was elected, Lincoln MacVeagh, who had been a firm supporter and favorite of Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, submitted his resignation as Ambassador. It was accepted by the new President, which I think was a great blow and shock to MacVeagh. He went into retirement back in Portugal in a villa near Estoril. So

then Jimmy Dunn was appointed Ambassador to Spain. Since I had the great pleasure and fortune of serving under Jimmy Dunn twice, I just wanted to be sure that I had it in proper context chronologically. Thus succeeding Lincoln MacVeagh, Jimmy Dunn, who had been in Rome for quite a long while, was transferred as Ambassador to Madrid. I continued to serve him until 1953. In 1953 Homer Byington, who was the Director of Western European Affairs in the State Department, arranged with me and persuaded the Department to transfer him to Madrid to be Jimmy Dunn's Minister Counselor, and to transfer me from Madrid to Washington to be the new Director of Western European Affairs.

Q: Smart man. Before we go into that, could you give me just a few words on what was engaging your time during the latter part of — I know what was engaging your time earlier on, it was breaking in new Ambassadors and that sort of thing and doing the reporting that we did. But you must have gotten by that time into the period when we were negotiating treaties for bases and what not in Madrid. Were you engaged in that?

JONES: You're absolutely right. That was what I was principally engaged in, and the Political Section was particularly engaged in negotiating with the Spaniards a base agreement. They are tough negotiators. We were constantly receiving instructions from the State Department. But the fact that the Spaniards were interested in negotiating a base agreement with us was of course very encouraging and rather a change in their normal diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe and with the United States. So we did indeed negotiate a base agreement, and Jimmy Dunn was then the Ambassador. When I was transferred back to the State Department in March of 1953, I believe it was, the day that we sailed from Gibraltar was the day that the base agreement was signed in Madrid between the Ambassador and the Spanish Foreign Minister. So I left with a sense of real accomplishment. While I wasn't there for the signing ceremony, I did know, the day that I sailed home that the agreement had finally been signed and that we had a base agreement.

Q: Was the agreement, the actual negotiation done by the Embassy or did they send out a special negotiating team or something for it?

JONES: No. As I remember, the negotiations were done by the Embassy. But of course the Attach#s.

Q: Military attach#s?

JONES: Exactly. The military attach#s were very much involved in it. But the negotiations were done by Jimmy Dunn and by the political and the military staffs in his Embassy. That I think was probably the most important thing that we did during that period. Our relations with the Spanish government were friendly and we were received by Franco with considerable respect. Having had three Ambassadors there during the time that I was the Charg# d'Affaires, I was privileged to ride with each new Ambassador in the open coach with horses to the Palace. ...

Q: El Pardo?

JONES: El Pardo, to accompany the Ambassador in presenting his credentials. Each time we were received by Franco. So ceremonially and politically it was a very interesting time for a Charg# d'Affaires to be stationed in Madrid in the late '40s and early '50s. I was there four years, from the end of 1949 to September of 1953.

Q: It says here that you were assigned to the Department in November of '53.

JONES: I think so. I got to the Department in '53 I feel sure.

Q: Yes, it was '53.

JONES: In the Fall of '53.

Q: All right. Then you came to the Department and took over the Office of Western European Affairs.

JONES: That's right. My Deputy was Bill Tyler who had been stationed in our Embassy in Paris.

JONES: I shouldn't say what Bill's assignment was before he came, but in any event, my background had been Spanish and Italian and his background had been French and Northern Europe. So I pretty much handled, continued my interest in Spanish/Italian and Balkan affairs and Bill handled most of the things that had to do with France and the Benelux countries in the North. Because Bill had been educated in England, also of course his relations and knowledge of England was a very great help.

Q: In fact it is hard to find any country in Western Europe that he wasn't pretty familiar with.

JONES: That's right. So in a way it turned out that we were a fairly good combination. It was a very interesting period from 1953 to 1958. I will not try to recall all of the important and interesting things that happened during that time, but I believe. ...

Q: Certainly you continued your Italian relationship as well as your Spanish relationship.

JONES: Yes. Also, that was the period of the formation of the great organizations of Europe. NATO was being formed and the military alliance of Western Europe was being formed at that time. So it was really a very interesting and in a sense gratifying, satisfactory time to see the recovery of Europe in the '50s and the part that the United States had had to play in it. And the continuing trend toward unification of Western Europe with all of the various community organizations that were established at that time, including the military.

Q: That was also of course in a way the dissolution of empire going on in which particularly the French and the. ...

JONES: And the British.

Q: ... and the Portuguese colonies were being dissolved.

JONES: Yes.

Q: Then you, as I recall it, towards the end of that period you moved up to be Deputy Assistant Secretary for a year or so, didn't you?

JONES: Yes, when Livy Merchant left, to go to Canada as Ambassador, Burke Elbrick became the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. And he asked me to move up and be a Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in, I think, my last year, let's say about 1957. But it might have been 1956. During that time of course I had an interest in all of European Affairs, which was the most interesting and satisfactory assignment.

I was then, by the grace of God and thanks to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, in January of 1958, named American Ambassador to Libya. But by then I had been in the Department for four years, over four years, so I was due an assignment. There had been a political appointee in Libya and President Eisenhower was persuaded that a career Officer would be a good idea, so I was named Ambassador to Libya, my first Ambassadorial post.

I left the Department in February of 1958, I believe, and traveled to Libya, arriving there — we went by plane most of the way, yes, that's true, we did go by plane — arriving in Tripoli in March of 1958.

Q: At this time the King was still in Libya? Our revolutionary friend had not appeared on the horizon.

JONES: Yes. And I wish I could recall. ...

Q: Not for some years later.

JONES: I was in Naples en route for quite a long while. The reason I didn't get there until March, I was in Naples for quite a long while waiting the word to move on to Tripoli. I remember now that the delay was because of the unfortunate illness of my predecessor who was confined to hospital in Wheelus Air Force Base. It was quite inappropriate, diplomatically, for an Ambassador to arrive in a country before the departure of his predecessor. So that's why I continued to be held up in Naples, which was delightful for me. My wife and daughters were there with me, (my son was in boarding school in Washington), and we lived in some style in the hotel in Naples, saw a lot of old friends and had a very delightful time there. But finally the Department decided that they couldn't hold me up any longer, that Ramadan was approaching and that I should get to Libya to present my credentials before the holy season of Ramadan had begun, during which period the King would not receive any Ambassadors.

So I was flown to Wheelus Air Force Base and moved into the Embassy residence in Tripoli. While there I did go and call on my predecessor Ambassador John L. Tappin, still in the hospital. Saw him and he was most apologetic about the delay his health had caused. Then I was told to proceed to Benghazi where we stayed with the Consul General and his wife, and then on up to Tobruk, where the King was in residence. I presented my credentials to His Majesty, King Idriss I in March of 1958. Because of the strict Moslem custom of women remaining in purdah, I had lunch separately with the King and my wife had lunch with the Queen. After lunch and after we had presented our credentials, we drove back down the mountain to Benghazi. I think we didn't even spend the night in Tobruk, I think we drove up and came back to Benghazi the same day. I was then fully accredited as the American Ambassador. We then went back to Tripoli, because the Libyan government in those days was stationed, at the time I arrived, in Tripoli, the capital of Tripolitania. Within a very short few months, by July of '58, it was time for the government to move to its Cyrenaica capital in Benghazi. So within three months, four months of my arrival in Libya, I transferred the major portion of the American Embassy from Tripoli to Benghazi and established the Embassy residence in Benghazi. Tripoli

became the place where the Charg# d'Affaires lived, Paul Barringer. That's not quite true. Rodger Davies.

Q: Was there before Paul?

JONES: Yes. Rodger Davies was the Charg# d'Affaires, (number two in the Embassy) in Tripoli, when I arrived and then stayed on in Libya with me as the Deputy Chief of Mission until Paul Barringer arrived. Rodger was then transferred and, as we know, later became Ambassador. He is one of the martyrs of our service; was assassinated later in his career.

Q: At this time our principal problem there was Wheelus Air Base?

JONES: That's right.

Q: That was our principal interest, certainly.

JONES: Yes.

Q: What other kinds of relations did we have? And what was your time spent on?

JONES: Really very little except for Wheelus Air Force Base and the large number of Americans who were stationed in and around Tripoli.

Q: Had the American oil companies started by that time? Or was that later?

JONES: After I got there in 1958 American oil companies heard that there was a possibility of oil in Libya and came over and began their drilling. There were a great many dry holes struck at the beginning in '59. It was sometime in 1960 when I was at a diplomatic reception, I believe in Benghazi, I think the government was still in Cyrenaica, that someone came up to me and said, "Mr. Ambassador, did you know that Esso Standard has struck a gusher in its oil field near the coast?" And I said, "What is a gusher?" He said, "17,000 barrels a day." And I said, "How much is a good oil well in Texas?" He said, "About

600." So I knew that Libya was no longer on the U.S./U.K. dole. Because at that time the only external source of income for the Libyan government, except for its principal export of peanuts, was what the British paid for their base rights in Tobruk and what the American government paid for its base rights at Wheelus Air Force Base.

Q: There was no significant tourist income, really, I suppose.

JONES: No, there was not. I suddenly realized that Libya was going to be economically independent with this incredible news. And then of course between 1960 and the end of my tour there in 1962, other companies began striking incredible amounts of oil and Libya suddenly became the new great oil exporter of the world. This didn't happen overnight, but, by the time I left I think Libya was already getting something like \$200,000 a year from its oil. Considering that we had paid them \$10,000 a year for Wheelus and the British had paid them \$8,000 a year for their bases.

Q: I think you're talking millions, not thousands, probably.

JONES: Well, no, at the beginning you see it was hundreds of thousands. Now perhaps it is in the millions. By the time I left at the end of '52, all this oil wealth seemed suddenly incredible for a country that had had no external source of income at all, except what the great foreign powers were willing to pay for base rights.

Q: You said you left at the end of '52. You mean '62.

JONES: I'm sorry. '62, forgive me.

Q: What was your method of dealing there? Did everything have to be done with the King and his immediate advisors? Or was there an organized foreign office in the normal European sense that we're accustomed to that you dealt with while you were there?

JONES: No. The new system, well, the old system — the kingdom was only a few years old, established in 1952, and because Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, as you undoubtedly

know, were two separate entities, they refused to agree to one capital. So therefore it was agreed that the government would spend two years in the capital of Tripolitania and two years in the capital of Cyrenaica. And during the summer when the King was in residence in Tobruk that they would move to Beyda for the summer months. It was during this period that I was the first foreign Ambassador to decide to move with the government. When I told my colleagues in the diplomatic corps that I was going to move my residence and the Embassy staff to Benghazi when the government moved to Cyrenaica in 1958, most of them were very unhappy indeed. And most of them refused to move. But I think later it became customary for most of the embassies to move back and forth. The British did the same thing that I did, established an Embassy in Benghazi for the next two years, that would be from 1958 to 1960. And then I think we moved back to Tripoli again for two years and then when the King established the new capital permanently at Beyda I moved my residence up to Cyrene (nearby) and spent the last year with the government at Beyda.

My last years there were spent renegotiating the base agreement. But in answer to your question, I did do practically all of my business with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Minister who were representing the kingdom of Libya or the government of Libya in those days.

Q: Was the King a constitutional ruler or was he more or less a tribal chief who dictated? Did he pick all the ministers or were they accountable to a parliament or how does it work?

JONES: He picked the ministers, that's true. But the King was a constitutional monarch and interfered very little, perhaps not enough, in the conduct of government, so that when he appointed a prime minister and the prime minister then appointed his foreign minister and the other ministers, he ran the government on behalf of the King. And the visits to Tobruk where the King preferred to live, or to Beyda where he eventually established himself, were more ceremonial than businesslike.

Q: Were the government people mostly all educated and trained by the Italians? Or had they developed a native training system of their own?

JONES: Tribal politics I'm sure played a great deal in this and I was not terribly cognizant of it. But most of the ministers that I dealt with, in fact all of them, had been raised in Italian schools, had been raised during this Italian period of colonization. So I was able, with very little restudying, to get back to use my Italian.

Q: Which was quite difficult.

JONES: Yes, after four years in Spain. But I did find an Italian professor there who helped me a great deal, and I soon came back and practically all of my negotiations, except the specific and serious base negotiations when we were dealing with articles and paragraphs, were done in Italian. And I think that the ministers were rather pleased to have an excuse to speak Italian, a language which they all spoke fluently and which they obviously couldn't speak to each other, to have an Ambassador, besides the Italian Ambassador, that they could speak Italian to. So really for that five years in Libya, back and forth, I conducted most of my official business in Italian.

When I went to see the King I had to take an interpreter with me because the King obviously spoke no Italian, spoke only Arabic. I had a wonderful Palestinian named Mohammed Salah who went with me and spoke beautiful Arabic and also, being a Palestinian, was raised in English schools and spoke beautiful English.

Q: And that was

JONES: Mohammed Salah, S-a-l-a-h.

By the way, in 1988 he is now living in Washington and is an American citizen, I'm happy to report.

Q: Very interesting. Did you have usually two or three Arabists on your staff?

JONES: Yes.

Q: Rodger Davies of course was one.

JONES: Rodger Davies was one. Another was Harrison Symmes. And the Libyan Desk Officer was Richard Parker, Dick Parker, who is now the president or chairman of the Association of Diplomatic Studies.

Q: Right. I tell you, we are just about at the end of this tape. Do you want to just lead into how you left Libya. It's after 12 and I know you have to go. We haven't got more than two or three minutes.

JONES: I think I'd just like to finish up by saying that I did have the great success, I consider one of my principal diplomatic successes, of renegotiating the base agreement with the government of Libya before I left, because it was about to run out in 1963, I've forgotten the exact date. And I was able to renegotiate with a higher payment, of course, but I was able to renegotiate the base agreement with Libya for Wheelus Air Force Base before I left.

Q: So you left your successor no immediate serious problem.

JONES: That's right. The base agreement had been. And I learned a lot from that series of negotiation, patience, patience, patience. Negotiation over a period of a year or more.

Q: I never had a big negotiation like that so I envy you the. ...

JONES: When I look back on it, I must say quickly that Libya was one of the most successful and delightful and pleasant posts of my entire service. And it's interesting because now, given the reaction of most people to Libya, it's hard to believe that Libya in

the late '50s and early '60s was one of the most delightful posts. And of course with the Greco/Roman ruins along the northern Mediterranean shore. ...

Q: I was going to say, and the Mediterranean.

JONES: And the Mediterranean. And my wife's interest in archeology, she loved it as much as I did because she was constantly involved in some new archeological find or dig, which she would hear about and sometimes go and visit.

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Q: Ambassador Jones, when we left off some 10 days ago we were rather finishing up your assignment as Ambassador to Libya and you talked something about the completion of the base agreements there and about people you have on your staff. I wonder if there are any transition remarks you want to make about leaving Libya and your assignment to your next post, or anything else you want to add about Libya, as far as that's concerned. If you would go ahead on that.

JONES: Yes. One interesting incident or event in my Libyan tour was the visit of the Crown Prince of Libya to Washington in the fall of 1962. It was not an official visit, or a state visit, because it was not the King that was coming but it was his heir, his nephew, the Crown Prince of Libya, and it was called a "Presidential" visit. I arrived on an Air Force plane from Libya with the Crown Prince in October of 1962. The Prince was in Washington for a three-day visit and then was taken by the Chief of Protocol on a tour of the United States before he returned to Libya.

The Crown Prince was received at the airport by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. On the way back the Prince went off with the Libyan Ambassador and I rode back from the airport to my quarters in Washington with the Secretary. He told me, on the way back, that I might find that the President, who was John F. Kennedy, a bit preoccupied because we had just had some disturbing news about Russian activities in Cuba. I thought not

much more about that, of course, and in the afternoon I believe the President had a meeting with the Crown Prince. In any event, the next day the Crown Prince was due at the White House for a luncheon and as we were there waiting to be ushered in, the President called and said that he wanted to speak to the Ambassador. We said, "Which Ambassador? Libyan or American?" He said, "The American Ambassador." So I went in and the President seemed to be rather flustered and pressed for time, but I didn't think anything about it particularly, it was part of his general busy schedule.

He said, "Tell me about this young man. I saw him at the Libyan Embassy last night and I found it rather difficult to communicate with him. I just don't understand him." I explained to the President that the Crown Prince had been raised in strictly Moslem society, that he had not gone to formal school but had been raised by a study of the Koran, that his marriage had been arranged by his family and that the Prince had never before been outside of Libya. This was part of his education and I felt that it was important for him, if he were going to be the next King of Libya, that it was important for him to have as his first foreign visit and first foreign contact the United States and a visit to the President and to our capital and to our country. That he was really a very provincial young man with no foreign experience, really very little national experience even in his own country.

I of course learned later that the President was under enormous pressure during the whole time of the Crown Prince's visit because he had learned about the missiles in Cuba and was considering what position to take with Khrushchev on the Cuban missile crisis. My admiration for the President has always been enormous: during this very critical period in his political life and in the history of our country, that he was able to appear to the general public, whenever he was with the Crown Prince either in the White House or at the Libyan Embassy, that the Crown Prince's visit was the most important thing that he had to deal with that day.

It was only after the Crown Prince had left Washington and was taking his North American or United States tour that the President made his famous speech about the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the position that he had taken with Khrushchev.

Next subject: While I was on my visit in the United States waiting for the Crown Prince to complete his American visit, I was told by the Director General of the Foreign Service. ...

I was going to soon receive official notice that the President wished to appoint me his Ambassador to Peru. This came as a complete surprise, but of course I was delighted. I had been in Libya for five years and it was high time for a transfer.

The interesting and amusing part of the Peruvian appointment, ironic in a sense, the President's Ambassador or the American Ambassador in Peru, appointed shortly after President Kennedy became President in 1961 was a man named James Loeb, a political appointee, publisher of a newspaper in New England. He had been there at the time of the Presidential elections when Haya de la Torre, the Aprista candidate for President, was elected. I learned later that there were rumors that Mr. Loeb had been very pro-Aprista and some of the Aprista opponents and opposition had indicated or even accused publicly the American Ambassador of being pro-Aprista and having helped Haya de la Torre win the election. After Haya de la Torre won the elections but before he had assumed the presidency, there was a military coup and the military coup was based on decades of animosity between the military and the Aprista Party. No Aprista President, even though Haya de la Torre and others had won the elections, had ever been able to take over the presidency because of the military animosity. So this was a military coup against Haya de la Torre and the Aprista Party to prevent him from ever assuming the Presidency.

This was the year after the President, President Kennedy, had taken a lead in establishing what was known as the Alliance for Progress and had been in Punta del Este at the time of the forming of this alliance and established certain principles, including which were democratic government in all of the countries that were part of the Alliance for

Progress in Central and South America. The military coup in Peru was the first obvious move against the principals of the Alliance for Progress by a military coup against a democratically elected, established government. President Kennedy was so shaken by this, so disappointed, so discouraged and so outraged that he recalled his Ambassador, James Loeb, as an indication of American displeasure.

The months went by, the Charg# d'Affaires was Douglas Henderson. The military seemed to be firmly in control in Peru. Eight or nine months later after the coup d'etat it was reported that Ralph Duggan, the President's assistant in the White House, said to him, "Mr. President, you know, those military are firmly in control and they are not going to go away and we do not have an Ambassador in Peru. I think you ought to think about appointing an Ambassador to the military government, just accept it as a fact of life." The story is, which perhaps is apocryphal, but rather amusing-the report that I heard was, that they were looking around for an Ambassador that didn't have any previous connections with Peru and couldn't possibly be accused of having any political preferences for one party or another. Here I was, having been five years in Libya and about ready to leave, and never having served in a Latin American post in my life, except for the little post in Mexico at the very beginning of my service where I was stationed for nine months only.

Q: But you did at least speak Spanish.

JONES: Yes, my record showed that I had been four years in Spain and therefore I had language qualifications. So the story was that they appointed Johnny Jones Ambassador because he didn't "know nothing" about Peru.

I learned while in Washington that this appointment was going to take place and by the time I got back to Libya and was able to tell my wife, in confidence, that we were going to Peru, the orders had already been written and were on their way. This interesting coincidence of the Cuban missile crisis and the visit of the Crown Prince of Libya to Washington also brought with it news of my next assignment and appointment to Peru.

So we came home for Christmas in 1962, on home leave and transfer. I left Libya in mid-December, had Christmas in Annapolis with my wife's family and then was sworn in in early January, as Ambassador to Peru and got down to Peru I believe in January of 1963.

Q: Great. Could you tell us a little about the problems you found there and how you coped with them?

JONES: I presented my credentials to an Ambassador and interestingly enough. ...

Q: To an Ambassador?

JONES: I'm sorry, forgive me. To a General. I will have his name in a moment. Perez Godoy, General Perez Godoy. The Chief of Protocol in those days was a young Peruvian named Javier Perez de Cuellar, who, as we all know, is now the Secretary General of the United Nations. But Javier and his wife became very good friends of Kitty and me.

Q: I just wanted to get that for the transcribers.

JONES: We were met at the airport and conducted into town by Javier. Douglas Henderson was the Charg# d'Affaires. (He later was our Ambassador to Bolivia.) I presented my credentials to General Perez Godoy at the Presidential Palace within a few days thereafter.

My instructions in a vague sense were that, while we would maintain formal and polite relations with the military government, I should do everything possible to encourage a return to democratic government; to the re-establishment of constitutional government. And it was within that first year, after I arrived, that the military decided that they would hold Presidential elections for a new President who would succeed the military government. Perez Godoy was not one of my favorites, but there were some good military in that government from well-established Peruvian families who did want a return to constitutional government. This was arranged and we were all delighted with it. Of course

the American Embassy in particular encouraged all Peruvians and all officials in the military government in this direction.

As we know, Fernando Belaunde Terry was elected President of Peru and I think the date, I would have to check this, but I think the elections were the same year that I arrived, 1963. But it may have been a year later, it may have been in 1964. This is perfectly easy to establish once I get hold of my papers. (July 28, 1963 is the date Belaunde was sworn in as President).

Q: That any researcher can find out by looking. ...

That is a rather delicate proposal to encourage a people in how they form their government, what kind of government they have. Did you have any particular techniques that were successful?

JONES: I don't think really. I think it was generally known that the President of the United States had been a key figure in establishing the Alliance for Progress, that the Alliance for Progress was a key element in the economic development of the Latin American countries, so that all Latinos who thought in economic terms realized how important it was to stay within the bounds of the Alliance for Progress, which also included continuation or maintenance of democratic government. So this would be one of the points that we could always talk about. Economic aid, I remember, was suspended for a period but when I went as Ambassador, accredited to the military government, economic aid continued to flow in the same way. It was just generally understood that this was what the President wanted and that as his Ambassador I would talk about it and encourage it at all points.

The Aprista Party was defeated and Belaunde's party was called Accion Popular. It was considered left of center but it was not considered as far left of center as the Apristas, so therefore there was no real threat or fear of another military coup before Belaunde could be inaugurated. We went to the inaugural ceremonies, of course, and there were several U.S. Senators and Congressmen, whose names I shall perhaps think of during the

course of the conversation, who came down to represent the President, as a Presidential delegation, at the inauguration of the democratically elected President of Peru. [The delegation was headed by Senator Morse and included Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State and Ralph Dungan, White House aide.]

The President and his first wife had been separated. So he was a bachelor when he took office. In any event, we had very cordial relations with the new President and I came to be very fond of him and got to know him very well. We worked together within the Alliance for Progress with the AID program. He had various grandiose schemes for the development of Peru, one of which was called the Carretera Marginal which was a great scheme to build roads down across the mountains onto the other side of the Andes into what was territorially a much greater expanse of Peru than the very narrow strip along the coast where most of the population and civilization existed.

This was to open up the interior of Peru and bring the products of the peasants on the other side of the Andes down to the coast and make also politically a connection between that very separated part of Peru (very little explored and known part of Peru, which was a jungle really), and the coastal area. Anyway, this did not receive very much enthusiastic support in Washington. They considered it a terribly expensive and inappropriate kind of an aid program. They were much more interested in developing what was already available. So one of the problems with Belaunde and the administration in Washington was getting aid for the kind of programs that he wanted and aid for the sort of programs that we thought would be most appropriate for Peruvian development.

I think eventually the President did get some assistance for his road-building scheme because it was realized that perhaps opening up the eastern part of Peru across that great divide of the Andes was in his country's long-term interest.

Q: How was your AID program administered? Did you have a large staff in Peru? Or was most of the work done by visiting specialists and instructors?

JONES: No, we had a large staff, AID. Robert Culbertson was the AID Director. He was very good and we worked together in great harmony. The AID programs were always discussed at the country team meetings. Everybody's views were obtained on what would be the best thing to recommend to Washington. Then of course the AID program and the administration in Washington had their own definite ideas about what they thought Peru needed, so that there was always considerable negotiation between the field and Washington about recommendations on what our AID program should be.

Q: It's much easier to coordinate around the table in the field than it is around the streets of Washington.

JONES: It is indeed. It is indeed.

It was an interesting period while Belaunde was there and we had very good relations. I'm trying to think of what other things came up during that period.

Q: Drugs had not raised their ugly head by that time, I suppose?

JONES: No, not really. Where I first learned of and was introduced to the coca plant was in Peru because it grew wild in the mountains of Peru. Its leaves were something that were brewed and either drunk in tea or chewed like tobacco by all of the peasants in the high Andes because it gave a certain amount of strength and endurance-let's say like coffee does or tea, to the peasants and of course most of them walked. In those high altitudes they had enormous chests; they were rather short people, their legs were not very long and they were used to carrying heavy burdens. But they needed something to sort of give them that extra heave. Now in leaf form it's not a drug anymore than coffee or tea is because it was not ground down to the fine powder that cocaine is, but it did have this medicinal effect of giving one a little more energy and a little more strength. When they were carrying their packs over the mountain trails, from the days of the Incas, coca was the sort of thing that they chewed. Then of course later, it was not during the time I was

there, but later, it became very popular crop because they could sell it to drug dealers and get enormous fees for it.

My wife and I did a lot of visiting during the time we were in Peru. I felt that it was important for an Ambassador to get around and know the country so we visited all the great cities and were usually welcomed there by the mayor and the town council. My Spanish over the years improved so that I was able to make speeches in Spanish. Arequipa, was the hometown of the President, Fernando Belaunde Terry. His last name implies an English ancestor. There was an important Anglo community in Peru, descended from early English immigrants who had stayed on and became completely Peruvian, but they kept their English names. One of my dear old friends was Carlos Gibson, "Charley" Gibson, who married an American, Flo, and is now living in this country. But Gibson was a perfectly acceptable Peruvian name. Another was the Archbishop Land#zuri Ricketts. His mother was a Miss Ricketts, obviously of English extraction. And the President was Belaunde Terry, and his mother was a Miss Terry, obviously of Anglo extraction. So there was an important British influence in the upper classes, in the ruling classes, of many Peruvian families.

Q: Did you have to relearn Spanish in a sense? In other words, not to refresh it, but is Peruvian Spanish guite different from Castilian Spanish? Or is it fairly close?

JONES: Peruvian Spanish and Columbian Spanish I believe are considered, by Spaniards, the best Spanish in Latin America, which means that they have been less changed. But of course they do not use the "theta". But I made no effort to change my Castilian Spanish when I was in Peru, I continued speaking with the theta. I think in a way it was rather a plus for me because it sort of impressed people. It would be like a foreigner speaking English in America with an Oxford accent. So I think it didn't do me any harm. Almost every time I went to a new place and started speaking, some Peruvian would say to me, and where did you learn your Spanish? I would say, in Spain, and they would

understand perfectly well that I was not affecting this accent but that this was the way I had learned my Spanish.

Q: How long did Belaunde last?

JONES: I'm trying to think when the coup d'etat was. Unfortunately, I tell my friends, and I'll tell you, that I stayed in Peru too long. If I had left in early 1968 when there were some suggestions that I might be transferred back to the Department of State (which I resisted) if I had left in 1968 I would have gone out in a blaze of glory, because our relations with Peru were excellent at that time. But, unfortunately, I stayed on and on October 3, 1968 I was wakened by a telephone call either from my Minister Counselor or from the head of the Political Section, Frank Ortiz, saying, "Mr. Ambassador, there are tanks in the courtyard of the Presidential Palace and they're pointing out, which means that there's been a military coup and that the military are already inside and in possession of the Palace."

This was a blow and really unexpected. However, I have failed to mention — and this was one of the reasons for the coup, I'm afraid — that in my negotiations with Belaunde, we had worked out a very sticky, long-standing problem involving an American oil installation in northern Peru which had belonged to Esso Standard. What we worked out was that this was property which in early Peruvian days the American oil company — not early Peruvian days, but the early part of this century or perhaps even the last century, the American oil company Esso Standard had bought this property (called La Brea y Pari#as) and considered that they owned it. The Peruvians agreed that their title showed that they owned it, but their dispute was that they didn't own what was under the ground. And because this was an oil well, the Peruvians were constantly threatening to expropriate it. One of my principal tasks in the latter years of my tour there was to work out an agreement with the government of Belaunde favorable to Esso Standard and favorable to American interests and one that the Peruvians could accept. We agreed that Esso Standard could have a lease on the oilfield at La Brea y Pari#as for X number of years, I've forgotten now how many, 10, 15, 20 years, in exchange for which the title to the property would be

returned to the government of Peru. So this settled the dispute over the title, but it also protected the interest of the oil company. [Telephone]

Q: You were working out the agreement on the Esso Standard oil claim.

JONES: Yes. In any event, this agreement when it was announced — and I of course was pleased with it — seemed to be a great achievement, but we were immediately attacked by a local newspaper, El Comercio, which was a very nationalistic newspaper and usually supported military coups whenever the government was considered a little too far to the left. It was also violently anti-Aprista, El Comercio always had been. So it immediately began attacking this agreement and pointing out that Belaunde had really sold Peru down the river and had given away Peruvian oil rights, etc., etc., etc.

So in a sense the coup d'etat by the military was not only against a left of center government but also against the deal that they had struck with the United States over this oilfield. So the coup d'etat meant the end of this agreement. I was perfectly aware of that. The general who carried out the coup was General Velasco. He was not a friend of the United States and curiously enough, was rather a Socialist in his outlook when he became President.

Among other things, he started nationalizing private companies. Of course the first thing he did was nationalize American companies and then all foreign companies. So that my last year in Peru was a very sad one, diplomatically and professionally, because I spent most of my time carrying notes of protest to the Foreign Minister, who was an admiral in the Peruvian Navy, whose name I shall think of — Admiral Llosa. He was, on my terms, a good guy. But after all, he was part of the military government and he had to carry out the government's policies.

The nationalization process continued. Then there were elections in the United States and Richard Nixon was elected President of the U.S. I was called home on consultation. The principal problem that we talked about was the military government and the expropriation

of American properties. Also, not only was it just the oilfield at La Brea y Pari#as, but when they expropriated all foreign companies, they took over an American lead and copper mine near Lima, up in the mountains, and they also took over an American copper mine in the south, south of Arequipa. Toward the end of my tour there, my principal activities were a series of protests about another American commercial property that had been expropriated and taken over by the military government. When I came home on consultation it was decided that, since I had been in Peru so long and had been so closely associated with former President Belaunde, it would probably be wise to send a special envoy, representing the new President of the United States to Peru to negotiate with the new military government over the expropriation of American property and a just compensation that we should be getting for it, because it had been expropriated without any compensation.

A very distinguished American named Jack Irwin — does that name mean anything to you?

Q: Yes, indeed. Jack Irwin was a lawyer who was associated on many problems with the State Department.

JONES: Yes, that's right. Jack Irwin was appointed. IBM, thank you. Jack Irwin was appointed Presidential envoy to come down and negotiate with the Peruvian government. I was informed that my days in Peru were not exactly numbered, but that they wouldn't last very much longer. I had been there six years. So I learned from my good friend, Toby Belcher, who was then Director of West Coast Affairs in the Interamerican. ...

Q: ARA.

JONES: ARA, yes. American Republics. That they'd look around for another post for me. I was nominated (I leaned later) to be Ambassador to Mexico. But unfortunately there was someone in the White House on Mr. Nixon's staff who decided that there were political

favors to be paid. So when my nomination came from the State Department it was not acted on and a political appointee got the job as Ambassador to Mexico.

In any event, I came home in 1969, in late spring of 1969. When I got home, I was disappointed to learn that there were no diplomatic missions available to me but that I was going to be appointed, unless I strenuously objected [break in tape] — as Deputy Commandant for International Affairs at the National War College in Washington. I thought about this and while I was disappointed not to have another mission, as I said earlier, I decided that this would be an interesting end to my service, having two years in an academic institution. Since during my long career I had never been selected to go to any of the war colleges, which many of my colleagues had, this was an opportunity to be part of one. So my wife and I moved into Quarters 15 at Fort McNair when the National War College was an entity unto itself, before the Defense University complex had been established. We had our last two years of active service, living in the United States at Fort McNair and being part of a very interesting faculty and part of a very interesting educational institution which included, of course, not only the three military services but also representatives of the State Department, the United States Information Agency and the CIA.

Q: And some other, Treasury and various other people here and there, the FBI sometimes had a man down there, and so on.

What were your general duties as Deputy Commandant? Were they largely ceremonial or did you have some substantive duties or administrative duties or consultative duties? What kinds of jobs did you have there?

JONES: I remember with each class, as it came in, that each one of the Commandants would get up and address the student body, telling them more or less what their position and duties were. And also to talk a little bit about the field in which they worked. So when I would present myself to the student body I would also discuss current foreign policy issues

that the government of the United States was facing at that particular time concerning which we would be getting lectures later on. Then when there were civilian lecturers on political topics, during the course of the academic year, I would be the one who would be expected to introduce them to the student body.

It turned out to be a very interesting and very productive part of my personal as well as official life, living in an academic atmosphere and meeting a lot of very interesting people including ranking State Department officials who would come out to talk to us and also those from other parts of the government.

Looking back on it, I must say I enjoyed that two years at the War College very much.

Q: I would think it would have been a very good transition back to retirement and private life and so on.

JONES: A nice way after 40 years or 38 years in the Foreign Service abroad to come back to the United States and eventually to retirement in Flat Rock, North Carolina.

Q: Just for curiosity, did you find that your knowledge and talents were called upon at all by the State Department during this period? I mean, consultation on current problems or anything of that sort? Or, as I suspect, were you generally ignored in this respect?

JONES: No, I don't think I was consulted at all. It was considered that I had a specific task to at the War College. I don't remember that I was consulted on anything.

Q: Ambassador Jones, we have most interestingly finished your career and I'm very glad I got this opportunity to get particularly the Peruvian part, which is absolutely fascinating. I wonder if you would mind perhaps reflecting a little bit on a few of the special problems of the Foreign Service and of the representatives of the executive branch abroad. Perhaps first I would be interested in your philosophical and practical views on the subject of political versus career Ambassadors because I think this tape has indicated that you've

had about as much experience as anyone in the service in dealing with both kinds of officers. We both know that they both have their place, but I'd be interested in any views and any illustrative experiences that you might have on the subject of when political Ambassadors are good and when they're bad. And perhaps the same thing might be said about career Ambassadors because we all know that career does not endow its members with perfection in all respects. But is this a subject that — I'm sure that you've thought about it a great deal and I'd like to hear what your. ...

JONES: Obviously I'm prejudiced. I'm prejudiced in favor of career Ambassadors and the career Foreign Service. And I don't need to go into all the reasons why, because you understand that. Most career Officers do. My own experience was pretty much with career Officers going all the way back to William Phillips, who was my Ambassador in Rome and Jimmy Dunn who was later my Ambassador in Rome.

Q: And Spain.

JONES: And Spain later, that's true. Yes. But some of the political Ambassadors, I must say, were very interesting. Particularly in Madrid when I was number two in the Embassy, it was important for me not only to have a good working relationship with them, but also to try and influence them as much as I could in the way of policy and also in the messages that they sent to the State Department, interpreting the country in which they were involved. Stanton Griffis was my Ambassador in Spain, very interesting man. He had had some other ambassadorial assignments, but had come from the movie industry, MGM. So my effort there was to try to edit his telegrams and dispatches to the State Department to bring them down to what I always considered more appropriate and less colorful language.

Q: For circulation in 50 copies all over the government.

JONES: At the same time, of course, I had to be very careful that I didn't offend the Ambassador and have him lose confidence in me where I would have been of no use.

I learned later that some of the people on the receiving end would say, how in the world did Johnny Jones let this cable get by? Well, what they didn't know was what it looked like when I started working on it.

Q: By the way, on this connection, you mentioned Griffis, but you did have. ...

JONES: Lincoln MacVeagh was the 2nd political ambassador to Spain, during my tour there.

Q: You also have a great many political Ambassadors under your watchful eye, at least, when you were Director of WE and as Assistant Secretary. Having been in that position I know that eight out of nine countries, I believe, had political Ambassadors, at least at the time I was in there. And some of them I thought were very good and some — you had Clare Luce and Dave Zellerbach and Houghton and Jock Whitney.

JONES: Amory Houghton.

Q: Amory Houghton was in Paris at the time you were there, I think. And Phillip Young was in the Netherlands, I guess, when you were there. There were guite a few others.

JONES: And who was in London?

Q: In London, at that time of course we didn't have London under WE.

JONES: That's right. WE was not part of United Kingdom . And in Spain, yes, we had — try to remember who was in Spain.

Q: Well, we had. ...

JONES: Jimmy Dunn was there when I took over, as Director of WE. I think Jimmy was there most of the time. But Clare Luce.

Q: John Lodge went to Spain.

JONES: That's true. John Lodge succeeded him, yes. John Lodge was a very interesting person and his wife, I think, played a very important part, Francesca, in his career. I had met them earlier in Spain when he had come over on a visit of some kind, so I already knew them. But he, I think, did quite a good job as a political Ambassador.

During the period, oh, let's see, Clare Boothe Luce. I had grave doubts at the time about sending a woman to a country like Italy which was so male-dominated and oriented that I couldn't imagine them accepting a female Ambassador from a great power in good grace. But it turned out that she did do a good job and that she was accepted by the Italians and, eventually they not only accepted her but began to admire her. Of course there was the unfortunate episode of the. ...

Q: Ceiling paint.

JONES: ... and poisoning perhaps and her illness. But she recovered from that.

Q: She certainly made things interesting all around.

JONES: Yes, she did.

Q: Do you feel, as I have always felt, that there were times when a political Ambassador was very useful, if he or she was good. That it was good to have somebody who had political clout at home, that it was good to have such people who had knowledge of the Foreign Service and its ability and could perhaps give us a constituent support, so to speak, after they had served as Ambassadors who came back. It could also cause grave problems of lack of that kind of experience and so forth. At the same time, there are times when a career Ambassador simply doesn't have the clout or the characteristics perhaps, he may have been an excellent reporting officer and may not be a great Ambassador. So

there are two sides to the coin. Do you have any thoughts on that rather presumptuous formulation of mine?

JONES: It is true that some political appointees who are close to a President can play a much more effective role as an American Ambassador [phone] but I think it's on the whole many of the political Ambassadors are appointed because they have made substantial contributions to a Presidential campaign or because they are close friends of important Senators or people in the administration who the President thinks are important to him. So very often, many of these people go abroad and the President doesn't even know them. And I'm not sure that they do indeed have the kind of. ...

Q: Access.

JONES: ...or any more access than a career Ambassador would have. I'm trying to think of some, oh, Lincoln MacVeagh was my Ambassador in Spain after Stanton Griffis. He was a political appointee but very close to the Democratic administration, having been appointed by Franklin Roosevelt, I believe. He had been Ambassador in Portugal and before that had been Ambassador in Greece. So he came with considerable background and in a sense, if I remember now, he had been an American Ambassador for 19 years when President Eisenhower was elected and ended a long, long period of a Democratic administration. As all Ambassadors had to do, Mr. MacVeagh submitted his resignation and to his great chagrin, and to my surprise, it was one of the very first resignations that President Eisenhower accepted. I think the Ambassador was very upset and discouraged, because if he had stayed in another year he would have completed 20 years and that might have given him right to a government pension. I'm not sure about that. But in any event, he was disappointed and left with some bitterness. But in a sense, it was a Godsend because then Jimmy Dunn was appointed Ambassador, career Ambassador, to succeed him and he came at a very important time when we were just completing the negotiations for our bases in Spain.

So I must say that in most of my experience, the career Ambassador have been the most effective.

Q: A second question that I think a Foreign Service Officer has a chance to observe and is of considerable importance is the process of policy formulation and tactical policy formulation that goes on in the United States government which I think is perhaps best reflected for the Ambassador by the accuracy and promptness of the instructions that he receives from the Department. Do you have any particular comments on this thing, being mindful that you were both in the chain of preparing those instructions on many occasions and for a much longer in the position of user of those instructions? Do you have any thoughts about how adequate they were? Did you generally find you could have a clear idea of what you were supposed to be doing?

JONES: If you were on the receiving end?

Q: If you were in the field, what the man in the field, what picture he had of his mission, what he should do in general and what he should do in specific crisis situations, let's say.

JONES: I think generally the instructions were clear and good. Because they were probably originally drafted by the Desk Officer of a particular country it meant that they were drafted by someone who had a fairly good, correct view of the country in which I as serving.

There was only one time when I was at odds with the Department and that was over the application of economic sanctions against the military government in Peru at the time of the coup in 1968. We had some legislation called the Hickenlooper amendment. The Hickenlooper amendment required that, if there was an expropriation of American property, immediately the sanctions would be applied, that any aid to the country would be immediately cut off. Since we had threatened President Belaunde with the Hickenlooper amendment unless he reached an agreement with us on the threatened oil

expropriation and the oil well problem, when the military government came along later and did expropriate that American property in the north of Peru, my recommendations to the Department were that we apply the Hickenlooper amendment and economic sanctions against the new Peruvian government.

There was a tendency in the Department and in the Interamerican Bureau and actually the Peruvian desk, too, that we negotiate, that we talk to them, that we not come down with the ax. Particularly because there was a new President in the White House and nobody wanted to tell the new President, Mr. Nixon, that the first thing he had to do as President was apply the Hickenlooper amendment to a South American country which would practically mean breaking off relations with it. So in these circumstances, the Department just didn't want to apply the Hickenlooper amendment, although I kept recommending it. I was told later, (I had sent some very top secret messages to the Secretary in this regard) that if I hadn't been so secretive about it and that if I had just sent my recommendations by less highly classified telegrams ,more people in the Department might have read them (and in the White House) and that I might have gotten more support for my position.

But in any event, I was not supported in this recommendation for I guess internal, political reasons. Didn't want a new administration to start off penalizing a friendly South American country.

But that was about the only time I think when there was a difference when I was Chief of Mission, between myself and the Department.

Q: We've talked about this a little before but I think there's room for a little more exploration of it. There are really two sections, one to do with the executive branch and the other dealing with Congress. To take the executive branch first; the question of relations between various entities of the executive branch which have a foreign affairs interest, and we all know everybody thinks they have a foreign affairs interest, throughout the government and those relationships as they also exist in the field where you have

representatives of these other agencies which may report to both the State Department and their own agency. I'd be interested in your comments on your relations perhaps first in your Embassy itself with the AID missions, the information missions, with the CIA, which is a difficult and thorny question, and perhaps with any other agencies that might have been represented — the military missions, certainly, are an important element. Do you have any thoughts on this or experiences? Were they generally satisfactory? Were there instances of their being unsatisfactory? What were the techniques you used to get coordination?

JONES: I think in general they were satisfactory. I found that the country team meetings were very helpful method of bringing up questions of different points of view and instructions from the various agencies who had different bosses back in Washington, of discussing them and talking them out there and reach a decision which generally would be accepted all around. If it was contrary or slightly different than the instructions that the aid, the attach# had had from his agency, he could go back and report that this was a decision that was reached and this was what the Ambassador recommended, or I could report it to the State Department. So on whole, I think generally as a result of the briefings of the country team meetings, that we worked out most of our problems.

Now the one thing, of course, that we didn't discuss were covert actions. But I always had a very good relationship with my CIA chief. My rule was that I was kept informed of all principal plans and actions and projects that were going to be developed and carried out in a covert manner. But the one thing that I never asked for, and said I didn't want to know, were the names of the local informants or the local people who were collaborating with the Central Intelligence Agency in these activities. And by and large I think — perhaps we didn't have anything very important — but by and large I think it worked very well and I never had any scandal or complication or problem with it.

Q: Did you feel either as an Ambassador or perhaps as a Political Officer lower down the totem pole in the Embassy that there was a competition between the intelligence collecting functions of the CIA and those of the, shall we say, Political Section of the Embassy?

Did this ever become a problem that you know of? Did you feel that there was too much emphasis on covert collection as opposed to the overt type of collecting and reporting that the Political Section did?

JONES: No, I don't think so. But I think, I hope, that I was informed and aware of the various projects and what was going on; what we were trying to accomplish and what we were trying to find out. Obviously during the length of time that we were having problems with the military government over the expropriation of property, any information that the CIA could develop over what the General was going to do next, what his plans were, that sort of thing, would always be very helpful. And I think that there was a fairly good, as I remember generally, good collaboration between the Chief of Station and the head of the Political Section. I think they kept each other informed. And of course the military reporting was overt intelligence, which was quite appropriate.

Q: Did you ever have occasions of a conflict with your military, or a struggle of wills with your military advisors or military attach#s? Particularly In Latin America this sometimes might have been a problem, I can imagine, with so much military to military contact between America and the local country. Or did you feel that you were on top of this and it never became a problem?

JONES: Yes, you've just reminded me of something. The Peruvian government under Belaunde wanted what was in those days, 1960s, a sophisticated airplane, F-4 is what comes to mind, I've forgotten exactly what it was. It was considered too sophisticated by the State Department, principally because we had as part of our policy not to sell sophisticated military equipment to any Latin American country. I urged the sale of these planes to Peru. The Government wanted them, the military wanted it. And I urged it as a precautionary measure to protect Belaunde because I felt that if the military — if the constitutional president was unable to get for his military what they said they needed to carry on, not only to carry on but to have a strong defense against territorial claims by Ecuador, for example, that then they might throw him out in a military coup. But the F-5s,

JONES: That's hindsight.

I think it was an F-5, the F-5s were considered too sophisticated so the State Department turned down my recommendations and the Peruvian request for F-5s.

Q: And this was an occasion, I presume, when you and your military people were in agreement.

JONES: In complete agreement, yes. But the interesting thing that happened was that Belaunde then, and of course this was a great disappointment and nothing I could do about it, he then turned to the Soviets who were absolutely delighted to furnish him something equivalent. This happened, I think, after I left. No, no, I shouldn't say that. It happened while I was still there. And with the military, Soviet military equipment, of course, came Soviet military advisors who detracted enormously from the advantageous position of our military advisors who were already there, attached to the Peruvian military.

Years later, I can remember that a successor of mine in Lima told me, back in 1983 when I visited Peru, just to consider all the Soviet military equipment and advisors that were still there. And it all started with that F-5 episode. If only we could have known how much better it would have been if we had kept the military sales in our camp rather than saying no to the F-5s, which invited the Soviets in.

Q: That's very much the horns of a dilemma, I would say, that you were on in this respect.

Q: Of course there's one other element that we've all had to deal with a great deal, both at home and in the field, and that is the interest of the Congress in foreign affairs and the practical effect it has in the field of a good many Congressional visitors. And also special Congressional interests and policies which may, or practices which may be in conflict with the views of the State Department and/or the views of the Embassy. I presume you've had a lot of experience with Congressional visitors, to start with, during your time. Did you

feel on the whole that these were beneficial or caused more problems than they helped to solve?

JONES: Congressional visits were always a very important part of our diplomatic life and of the mission's experience. We knew how important the Congress was, we knew how important the members' views were to what we were trying to achieve. So I think we made every possible effort to help them, to try to brief them, but also to try to make clear to them what was the accepted State Department and administration policy at the time, in the hope that when they went home they would support it.

I found in dealing with them that they were really a very diverse group. You talk about a Congressional visit as thought it was a unified whole, but in fact each one had his own particular interests and so we were really dealing with individual Congressmen and individual Senators, which took an awful lot of time and a certain amount of tact to give them all what they wanted to know. I suppose it's a useful experience. One wonders really how much Congressmen do get out of a three-day visit to a country. They are exposed to Embassy briefings, to the briefings of the authorities of the country that they're in. But it's a very short time to really learn anything. And when they go back, does it really affect their decisions and their policymaking? I'm not sure that they (the visits) really are an effective tool.

Q: At least the Congressman does have the opportunity, whether he does it or not, of paying undivided attention to the problem of foreign affairs for those two or three days whereas at home he'd be doing a thousand other things, interrupted by constituents, votes on the floor, debates, so on and so forth. At least there is a concentrated period there that. ...

JONES: That's true.

Q: That we did have to present to them

JONES: Yes, I think probably you're right. On balance it probably is better that he's been exposed, even if only for three days, to a foreign culture and a foreign atmosphere. And there are certain impressions, undoubtedly, that he will carry away with him, that will affect his attitude and his vote down the line. So it's probably well worth it.

Q: I think that's been, this second session, has been just as interesting as the first and I thank you very much for giving me the time. Do you have any final comments or blessings for future generations? Any comments on the Foreign Service, how it should be changed or how things about it should be changed? Or anything else that you want to say?

JONES: I'm devoted to the Foreign Service and it was certainly a good career for me. As you know, I have a daughter now in the Foreign Service so I have a continuing active interest in it. The thing that concerns me I think is the present arrangement which is a result of the 1980 Foreign Service Act. There is something called a 6-year window and when people get up to the present Class 1, which used to be Class 3, or something like that, that then they have only a limited time before they may be selected out if not promoted into the Senior Service. I am distressed that this is the law because I am afraid that what happens during this period is that some of the very most effective and intelligent Officers will look ahead and think, well, if I wait six years, then life may have passed me by, if I don't make it. But if I now look around I'm young enough that I can find another occupation and another profession. So I'm afraid we lose at that point a great many of our first-class Officers who decide that they don't want to take the chance on waiting out the six-year window.

Q: Do you think maybe we are sacrificing in some extent experience to brilliance in the Foreign Service?

JONES: Yes, yes I do. I do think experience is terribly important.

Well, Tully, thank you very much.

Q: Thank you.

JONES: I'm delighted that the Association for Diplomatic Studies is beginning to establish an archives for the library.

Q: This will be an important part of it. Thank you, Ambassador Jones.

End of interview